On September 21, 2024, Tamils will vote in Sri Lanka’s presidential election, amidst significant disillusionment due to years of unfulfilled promises and ongoing assaults on Tamil communities. Historically, Tamil voter turnout has been low, averaging around 50% between 1988 and 2010. The current candidates’ alignment with Sinhala Buddhist nationalism has further fueled dissatisfaction, prompting some Tamil groups to support a unified candidate focused on accountability and self-determination. On September 1, 2024, MP Sumanthiran announced Ilankai Arasu Tamil Katchi (ITAK)’s endorsement of Sajith Premadasa, despite strong internal support for Pakkiyaselvam Ariyanenthiran, backed by a coalition of Tamil parties and civil society. Meanwhile, the Tamil National People’s Front (TNPF) has called for a boycott of the elections, reflecting the growing tensions and internal party conflicts. Reports from the People’s Action for Free and Fair Elections (PAFFREL) indicate an increase in election-related violence, highlighting the escalating unrest and the impact of these divisions on the party’s popularity.

The upcoming Sri Lankan presidential election is set for 21 September 2024. Incumbent President Ranil Wickremesinghe is seeking re-election as an independent, marking the first time since 2015 that a sitting president has pursued re-election. Other major candidates include Sajith Premadasa, leader of the Opposition and Samagi Jana Balawegaya (SJB), Anura Kumara Dissanayake of the National People’s Power (NPP), and Namal Rajapaksa, son of former president Mahinda Rajapaksa, of the Sri Lanka Podujana Peramuna (SLPP). The previous election in 2019 saw Gotabaya Rajapaksa win by a large margin, but he resigned in 2022 amid protests during Sri Lanka´s worst economic crisis, leading to Wickremesinghe’s ascent to the presidency. The European Union Election Observation Mission (EU EOM) will monitor the electoral process and will deploy 26 long-term observers and increase their presence as the election nears. Previous EU missions have highlighted electoral issues in Sri Lanka and suggested reforms.

 

Ilankai Tamil Arasu Kachchi (ITAK)
The Ilankai Tamil Arasu Kachchi (ITAK) is a Sri Lankan political party that represents the Tamil ethnic minority and was initially formed in 1949 as a breakaway faction of the All Ceylon Tamil Congress (ACTC). In 1972, ITAK merged with the ACTC and Ceylon Workers‘ Congress (CWC) to form the Tamil United Front (TUF), which eventually became the Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF). ITAK was re-established in 2004 after a split in the TULF and is now a key member of the Tamil National Alliancen (TNA).
Tamil National People's Front (TNPF)
The Tamil National People’s Front (TNPF) is a political alliance in Sri Lanka that advocates for the rights of the Tamil ethnic minority. Formed in 2010 as a breakaway from the Tamil National Alliance (TNA), its primary member is the All Ceylon Tamil Congress, along with former TNA MPs. The TNPF promotes the idea of „Two Nations in One Country,“ envisioning Sri Lanka as a multi-national state comprising both Sinhala and Tamil nations, and supports federalism to achieve this. However, unlike the TNA, it rejects the devolutionary approach to federalism and opposes the idea of a singular Sri Lankan or Sinhala state.
Samagi Jana Balawegaya (SJB)
The Samagi Jana Balawegaya (SJB) is a political alliance in Sri Lanka, led by opposition leader Sajith Premadasa. Formed in 2020 with the support of the United National Party (UNP), it quickly became the largest opposition party in parliament, securing 54 seats in the same year. The SJB has its roots in liberal-conservative principles but has shifted towards a more progressive, social democratic stance. Several smaller parties, including the Jathika Hela Urumaya (JHU) and Sri Lanka Muslim Congress (SLMC), also joined the alliance.
National People's Power (NPP)
The National People’s Power (NPP), also known as Jathika Jana Balawegaya (JJB), is a social democratic and socialist political alliance in Sri Lanka, founded in 2019 by Anura Kumara Dissanayake, leader of the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP). Comprising 28 political parties and organizations, it contests elections under the compass symbol, with Dissanayake as its leader and Nihal Abeysinghe as general secretary. The NPP has emerged as a significant third party in Sri Lankan politics.
Sri Lanka People's Front (SLPP)
The Sri Lanka People’s Front (SLPP) is the ruling political party in Sri Lanka, originally a minor party that was rebranded in 2016. It emerged from a split with the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) and became the political base for former president Mahinda Rajapaksa and his loyalists. While it shares some of the SLFP’s nationalist ideology, it rejects federalism and differs on economic policies. The party is currently led by Rajapaksa, with Sagara Kariyawasam as its general secretary.

Pakkiyaselvam Ariyanenthiran, the common Tamil candidate, has intensified his campaign by visiting significant Tamil sites and engaging with civil society activists. His election manifesto, launched in Jaffna[1], highlights historical and ongoing injustices faced by Tamils, such as state-led ethnic cleansing and militarization in Tamil areas. The manifesto calls for a new constitution recognizing Tamils as a sovereign people, a plurinational state, and international support for Tamil self-determination. It also addresses the need for investigating state-led ethnic cleansing and promoting economic self-reliance in Tamil areas. Ariyanenthiran’s candidacy aims to unify the Tamil community and raise international awareness rather than solely seeking the presidency.

The history of the Eelam Tamil liberation struggle

The Tamil liberation struggle in Sri Lanka is rooted in long-standing conflicts over ethnic rights and autonomy. The Tamils, who make up about 12.6% of the population, predominantly reside in the Northern and Eastern provinces, and have historically faced systemic discrimination from the Sinhala-majority government, which comprises around 74.9% of the population. This tension escalated into a brutal civil war from 1983 to 2009, fought between the Sri Lankan government and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), who sought an independent Tamil Eelam, a Tamil state in the northern and eastern regions of Sri Lanka. The war ended in 2009 with the defeat of the LTTE and a genocide against the Tamil population commissioned by the brothers, the then President Mahinda Rajapaksa and the then Defence Secretary Gotabaya Rajapaksa. Issues such as militarization, land grabs, and political disenfranchisement persist since then. The Tamil community continues to advocate for greater autonomy and protection of their rights amidst ongoing disputes and allegations of human rights abuses.

Political divisions and resistance

Supporting a common Tamil candidate in Sri Lanka’s presidential election highlights the belief that the Sinhala political framework provides no real advancement for Tamils. It highlights the failure of “moderate” Sinhala leaders like former President Maithripala Sirisena (2015 – 2019), whose initial cooperation on Tamil rights and accountability soon collapsed under Sinhala nationalist pressure. A Tamil candidate would stand as a symbol of defiance, sending a strong message to the international community about the unresolved Tamil struggle for justice and self-determination. While some Tamil groups oppose this, fearing it may lead to extreme Sinhala leadership, the argument is that Tamil progress comes not from compromise, but from continued defiance and international pressure.

The Ilankai Arasu Tamil Katchi (ITAK) faces internal conflict after its central committee announced support for Sajith Premadasa in the upcoming Sri Lankan presidential election. The decision has been criticized as a betrayal of Tamil interests. Leader-elect S. Shritharan, however, publicly backed the common Tamil candidate, Pakkiyaselvam Ariyanenthiran, with unanimous support from the Kilinochchi[2] branch. This split reflects growing divisions within the party. Some argue that supporting a Tamil candidate would send a strong message to the international community about the Tamil people’s demand for self-determination, while others, like the Tamil National People’s Front (TNPF), advocate boycotting the election altogether.

Sri Lankan police have frequently obstructed Tamil National People’s Front (TNPF) members, including MP Selvarajah Kajendren, in their campaign to boycott the presidential elections. Police have confiscated materials and blocked their efforts in various locations, including Jaffna and Mullaitivu[3]. Kajendren was recently arrested and later released but must appear in court on September 18. The TNPF has been advocating for the boycott since May 2024, criticizing the government’s policies towards Tamils as oppressive: “The Sri Lankan government views the Tamil homeland as an enemy. They continue their policies of Buddhization, militarization, and structural genocide in the homeland. As long as the majority representation remains in their hands, they will regard Tamils not as their own people but as adversaries”. The TNPF has faced ongoing harassment, with similar incidents reported previously in Ampara[4].

Ranil Wickremesinghe’s manifesto falls short of fully implementing the 13th Amendment[5], limiting devolved powers to Provincial Councils and addressing issues like militarization and land grabs only superficially. His plans include projects to address water scarcity and promote Tamil cultural events, aligning with India’s development initiatives for the North-East.

Anura Kumara Dissanayake expressed confidence in winning the election and urged Tamils to support his party, the National People’s Power (NPP), to avoid being labelled as opponents of change. His remarks have been criticized as coercive, pressuring Tamils to align with the majority’s agenda. Dissanayake’s statements and past actions, including dismissing calls for justice for war crimes victims and reassuring Buddhist monks about the constitution’s favouring Buddhism[6], reveal a lack of genuine commitment to addressing minority grievances.

Overall, the election reflects a complex and contested political landscape, with significant scepticism about the promises of change from various candidates. The deep divisions within Tamil political parties and the broader challenges faced by minority communities underscore the need for a thoughtful and strategic approach to securing their rights, interests and unity among Tamils.

 

[1] Jaffna is the capital city of the Northern Province of Sri Lanka and is located within the Tamil homeland of Tamil Eelam.

[2] Kilinochchi, located in the Kilinochchi District of Sri Lanka’s Northern Province, is situated southeast of Jaffna. It served as the administrative centre and de facto capital of the LTTE until January 2009, when Sri Lankan Army troops recaptured the city.

[3] Mullaitivu is the main town of Mullaitivu District, situated on the north-eastern coast of Northern Province.

[4] Ampara is the main town of Ampara District and located in the Eastern Province.

[5] The 13th Amendment to the Sri Lankan Constitution, passed in 1987 as part of the Indo-Lanka Accord, was designed to address the Tamil ethnic conflict by decentralizing power. It establishes a provincial council system, granting provinces authority over land, police, education, health, agriculture, housing, and finances. Additionally, it makes Tamil an official language and English a link language. However, its implementation has been contentious and incomplete, largely due to opposition from the Sinhalese majority and reluctance from various Sri Lankan governments to fully devolve powers. India has consistently advocated for its full implementation, viewing it as crucial for Tamil reconciliation and long-term stability in Sri Lanka.

[6] In Sri Lanka, Sinhala Buddhism refers to the dominant ideology that merges the Sinhala ethnic identity with Buddhism, shaping national policies and social dynamics. This ideology promotes the notion that Sri Lanka should be a bastion of Sinhala Buddhist culture and values, often marginalizing Tamil identities and aspirations. The government, supported by extremist monks and the Sinhala-majority military, has pursued policies that advance this agenda, such as constructing Buddhist structures in Tamil areas and encouraging Sinhala settlers to encroach upon Tamil regions. The overarching aim is to solidify Sinhala Buddhism’s influence across the island and diminish Tamil identity and autonomy.